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Introduction

In his 2006 Nobel Lecture, Muhammad Yunus envisioned a future where poverty would
be put "in museums."1 Such a world could be achieved, he argued, so long as the poor
had access to the right resources, especially affordable credit. Development donors and
the international community more generally echoed Yunus' enthusiasm for
"microfinance," with the United Nations declaring 2005 the International Year of
Microcredit.2 Indeed, the microfinance industry continues to grow in terms of the scope
of potential borrowers and lenders as well as its monetary valuation, as websites like
kiva.org allowed concerned "microlenders" in the Global North to make small loans to
"microentrepreneurs" in the Global South.
Yet as microfinance transformed from a fringe form of poverty alleviation to a
global industry, crises and fractures emerged that cast doubt on its advocates' claims of
ending poverty. In 2007, not long after Yunus and Grameen Bank won the Nobel Peace
Prize, the Mexican microfinance organization3 Compartamos held an Initial Public
Offering (IPO) that earned its owners over $150 million and valued the company at well
over $1 billion. The IPO attracted the attention of investment firms around the world, but
it also called critics' attention to the interest Compartamos charged its borrowers, with
effective rates approaching 90% on some loans.4 Yunus claimed that such interest rates
amounted to usury and should not even be considered microfinance, while other actors in

1

Muhammad Yunus, "The Nobel Lecture," 2006.
See the page for the International Year of Microcredit, www.yearofmicrocredit.org. It is worth noting that
while microcredit and microfinance are sometimes used interchangeably, microcredit refers to the provision
of credit to the poor, whereas microfinance refers to a broader array of financial services.
3
Henceforth referred to as MFIs.
4
Elisabeth Malkin, "Microfinance's Success Sets Off a Debate in Mexico." New York Times, April 5, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/business/worldbusiness/05micro.html?pagewanted=all
2
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the industry defended Compartamos' decision as necessary to the process of scaling the
industry in order to meet the vast demand for credit in the Global South.
This debate took on an even greater urgency in the wake of the "Andhra Pradesh
crisis," as hundreds of rural microfinance clients in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh
committed suicide due to heavy indebtedness. The crisis implicated some of the largest
MFIs in Indian microfinance, heavily impacting first the regional, then the national, and
finally the global market for microfinance. Furthermore, it emerged that field agents for
the MFIs in question had in some cases encouraged insolvent borrowers to commit
suicide so that the institution could collect life insurance or sell children into prostitution
to pay their debts. Critics of the industry claimed that the Andhra Pradesh crisis
demonstrated why microfinance does not work. Within the industry itself, different actors
identified regulatory failure as the cause of the crisis, while others pointed to excessive
commercialization; other advocates argued that it resulted simply from a few rogue MFIs
abusing their power. The popular press articles on the crisis painted a drastically different
picture from the one Yunus offered of industrious "microentrepreneurs" working their
way out of poverty with the help of MFIs.
This project interrogates the microfinance industry's representations of the
entrepreneurial poor. I argue that the microfinance industry represents and attempts to
constitute a "microfinance subject," an entrepreneurial poor woman5 that the industry
generally understands to be the same across the Global South. Yet I also argue that the
microfinance industry recognizes that this subject must be constituted or "programmed"
5

The bulk of microfinance loans go to women, and the microfinance industry represents them as the
intended recipients and beneficiaries of loans. For more analysis on how the microfinance industry and
development donors imagine women as the agents of economic growth and empowerment, see Katherine
N. Rankin, "Social Capital, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development". Feminist Economics. 8 (1): 124, 2002.

2

if microfinance interventions are to be successful. To constitute this subject, the
microfinance industry produces and deploys networks (or agencements6) of technologies,
personnel, knowledge, coalitions, and discourses. In what follows, I reframe the critical
literature on certain aspects of microfinance practice to offer a performative perspective
on the microfinance industry. In doing so, I aim to offer a picture of microfinance
agencements as well as the forms and distributions of risk these agencements produce.
In order to offer a broad sense of the actors involved in the microfinance industry,
its trajectory, and the history of its contestation, I begin in Chapter 1 with a brief history
of the industry and its relation to and role in changing development paradigms. This
history does not provide exhaustive detail, but rather some shared points of reference that
serve as context for what follows. In Chapter 2, I explore a central fracture in the
industry, between the "Bangladesh" and "post-Washington" approaches to microfinance.7
Specifically, I look to two "monuments"8 of microfinance discourse, Muhammad Yunus'
A World Without Poverty and Marguerite Robinson's The Microfinance Revolution,
which advocate for the Bangladesh and post-Washington consensuses on microfinance,
respectively. This chapter traces the key points of contention between these camps, but it
also identifies key resonances such as their representation of an entrepreneurial poor,

6

Following Michel Callon, "What Does it Mean to Say That Economics is Performative?" in Do
Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, edited by Donald A. MacKenzie, Fabian
Muniesa, and Lucia Siu. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. See also Chapter 3 of this project for
further analysis of the term.
7
I borrow here from Ananya Roy the language of the "Bangladesh consensus" and "post-Washington
consensus" on microfinance. See Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development, New
York: Routledge, 2010.
8
Following Iver B. Neumann, "Discourse analysis." In Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A
Pluralist Guide, edited by Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, Plagrave Macmillan, London: 2008, 61-77.
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what I refer to as a "microfinance subject."9 In Chapter 3, I argue that through competing
agencements of skills, ideas, discourses, technologies, and coalitions, the microfinance
industry attempts to constitute the "microfinance subject." Yet such agencements
inevitably have unintended consequences, and I also offer an analysis of how the
limitations of the industry's self-understanding become manifest in sporadic crises. In
conclusion, I discuss in Chapter 4 the political and ethical implications of the
microfinance industry's attempt to constitute "microfinance subjects," as well as
alternatives to current microfinance practice.
This analysis of the industry operates on a few assumptions. I take as a point of
departure the notion that the ideas, discourses, and languages deployed here are
productive. I thus examine two "monuments" of microfinance discourse in order to
examine how the microfinance industry understands its clients and the forms of
subjectivity that it projects on the poor of the Global South. Yet I also argue that this
literature is marked by a tension between the notion that the poor are "inherently
entrepreneurial"10 and recognition of the need to instill this form of subjectivity in order
for microfinance interventions to be successful. To explain how the industry manages this
tension, I turn to the work of actor-network theorists such as Michel Callon, to situate
microfinance discourse within a broader framework of social, technical, and material
forces--or agencements--that shape economic life. Furthermore, I argue that fractures
within the microfinance industry beget competing microfinance agencements, such as the

9

Drawing here on David Williams' formulation of "liberal subjects" in "Constructing the Economic Space:
The World Bank and the Making of Homo Oeconomicus," Millennium - Journal of International Studies.
28 (1): 79-99, 1999.
10
Drawn from Christina Barrineau's quote on the UN Year of Microcredit, cited in Thomas W. Dichter and
Malcolm Harper, “Introduction.” In What's Wrong With Microfinance? Rugby, Warwickshire, UK:
Practical Action Pub, 2007.
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Bangladesh and post-Washington camps on microfinance, which seek to equip
microfinance clients with different forms of subjectivity.
This project contributes to a burgeoning literature that examines the microfinance
industry from a performative perspective. Previous analyses of microfinance within this
theoretical tradition have examined financial technique and knowledge production within
the industry. While these are important contributions, the literature has neglected the
relations that these agencements create between actors within the industry and clients or
"microfinance subjects," which I argue is crucial to understanding the implications of
contemporary microfinance practice. Furthermore, I argue in conclusion that identifying
the nuances and risks of constituting "microfinance subjects" opens space for the creation
of new--and better--microfinance agencements.

5

Chapter 1: The “Microfinance Revolution” Revisited

While small-scale lending initiatives and credit cooperatives have existed for millennia, it
was only in 1990 that the term “microfinance” came into widespread usage to describe
the provision of financial services to the poor in the Global South.11 Interest in
microfinance grew rapidly, and by the early 2000s some within the development donor
community talked of a “microfinance revolution.”12 At around the same time, the World
Bank began advocating microfinance as an alternative to the structural adjustment
policies that had been integral to the development orthodoxy of the 1990s and as a way of
ushering in a new development paradigm that prioritized social issues. This section
addresses these trends, asking two related questions: first, what accounts for the rise of
microfinance within the development donor community? And second, how did
microfinance come to be understood as a challenge to neoliberal development orthodoxy?
To fully answer these questions, I first offer by way of background a brief history of “the
microfinance revolution.” This history in no way purports to be exhaustive; rather, it
presents a number of moments or events that operate as shared reference points in the
history of microfinance and the parallel history of its contestation.
Many histories of microfinance begin with Muhammad Yunus providing informal
loans to a group of poor women in rural Bangladesh. This experiment eventually grew
into a formal financial institution and Grameen (or “Village”) Bank was born. Yunus
begins his personal narrative of involvement with microfinance by recounting the poverty

11

Hans Dieter Siebel, “Does History Matter? The Old and the New World of Microfinance in Europe and
Asia.” Paper presented at From Moneylenders to Microfinance: Southeast Asia's credit revolution in
institutional, economic and cultural perspective, National University of Singapore, 7-8 October 2005.
12
Marguerite S. Robinson, The Microfinance Revolution. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001.
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that he saw in Bangladesh, and especially the effects of the 1974 famine.13 Seeing the
results of “market failure” firsthand while at the same time teaching economics at the
University of Dhaka led him to recognize “the emptiness of those theories in the face of
crushing hunger and poverty.”14 To Yunus, the theoretical and structural limitations of
capitalism—which he tellingly refers to as a “half-developed structure”15—meant that
mainstream finance could not address the growing needs of those living in poverty. In
this sense, Yunus depicts himself as an outsider looking in on the banking industry and
development orthodoxy more broadly. Yunus claims that this position constituted an
advantage innovating a new approach to poverty alleviation, arguing that “because I am a
practical-minded person who initially had no experience in rural development or banking,
I was relatively free of the preconceived ideas that tend to limit the thinking of most
people in the field.”16 For Yunus, the growth-led model of poverty reduction championed
by the development donor community was only part of the solution to global poverty.
Yunus' key innovation in addressing financial exclusion, however, was not
extending credit to the poor, but developing a method of ensuring high repayment rates
from poor borrowers without needing physical collateral that could easily scale. In the
Grameen Bank's “lending circles,” continued access to credit for any one borrower was
contingent on complete repayment from every borrower in the group. Yunus understood
that pressure from within communities created a strong incentive to repay, and thus
created a system that placed the onus of disciplining borrowers onto a community or

13

Yunus 2006.
Yunus 2006.
15
Muhammad Yunus and Karl Weber, Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future
of Capitalism. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007: 18.
16
Yunus and Weber 2007.
14
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lending circle, as opposed to the lending institution itself.17 The lending circle thus differs
from both informal lending, which often involves moneylenders pressuring borrowers
directly to repay, as well as formal credit provision, which generally requires some form
of physical collateral.
The scaling of this model depended in large part on institutional support from the
development donor community. While the “Grameen model” attracted some attention
from scholars and local development practitioners in the 1980s, the larger development
donor community invested little in the way of funding or institutional support.18 This
apathy towards microfinance resulted in part from the World Bank's development
orthodoxy at the time, which stressed the importance of investing in human and physical
capital, ends towards which microfinance held little promise. There was also concern at
the Bank that microfinance was “too leftish” to fit within their agenda.19 But as the
development orthodoxy shifted in the mid-1980s, from a policy of creating human capital
to one of structural adjustment, microfinance started to gain traction among the
international development donor community. The World Bank and other donor
institutions began to invest heavily in Grameen “clones” around the world.20 Institutional
investment in microfinance did not merely expand access to financial services for the
poor; it turned microfinance, which until then had remained a largely grassroots
movement, into a global industry, precipitating the commercialization of microfinance.21

17

John Adams and Frank Raymond, "Did Yunus Deserve the Nobel Peace Prize: Microfinance or
Macrofarce?" Journal of Economic Issues. 42 (2): 435-443, 2008.
18
Milford Bateman and Ha-Joon Chang, “The Microfinance Illusion." Unpublished manuscript, 2009
http://www.microfinancetransparency.com/evidence/PDF/App.3%20Chang%20Bateman%20article.pdf
19
Bateman and Chang 2009.
20
Adams and Raymond 2008.
21
Deborah Drake and Elisabeth Rhyne, The Commercialization of Microfinance: Balancing Business and
Development. Bloomfield, Conn: Kumarian Press, 2002.
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The World Bank and other institutions in the development donor community also
sought to professionalize the field of microfinance.22 They established the Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor (or CGAP; originally known as the Consultative Group to Assist
the Poorest).23 CGAP, housed at the World Bank, produces voluminous literature on
“best practices” in microfinance, hosts workshops, and holds a great deal of sway in the
production of microfinance knowledge.24 More practically, the creation of CGAP
represented a largely successful effort on the part of development donors to bring
microfinance into the fold of standard development practice. The creation of CGAP
consolidated pre-existing support for microfinance from governments, development
institutions, practitioners, and NGOs.
Large-scale donor institutions also expended a great deal of effort in promoting
microfinance through other avenues, notably a set of conferences that culminated in the
Microcredit Summit of 1997.25 While Yunus remained involved with and advocated for
the expansion of microcredit, a key divergence in the microfinance movement had
emerged between the World Bank model and the Grameen model. The World Bank’s
foray into microfinance shifted the emphasis from local ownership and grassroots
institutions to expanding mainstream finance firms and incorporating microfinance and
institutional production of knowledge within the larger framework of international
development. These efforts to promote and expand microfinance during the mid-2000s
solidified the industry's standing among development donors and the broader

22

Dichter and Harper 2007.
This shift from "Poorest" to "Poor" perhaps reflects CGAP's position in debates about whether the very
poorest populations should receive credit. I elaborate further on this debate and CGAP's role in it in
Chapter 2.
24
Roy 2010.
25
Dichter and Harper 2007.

23
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international community, as evidenced by the United Nations' declaration of 2005 as the
"International Year of Microcredit" and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Yunus
and Grameen Bank in 2006.
While the rapid expansion of the industry generated enthusiasm for microfinance,
it also created tremendous controversy. In 2007, mere months after Yunus was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize, Compartamos, a Mexican MFI, raised $467 million from private
investors in an Initial Public Offering (IPO). While Yunus quickly denigrated the owners
of Compartamos as the “new usurers,”26 industry observers saw the Compartamos IPO as
an inevitable outcome of the commercialization of microfinance. As one microfinance
consultant noted in the immediate aftermath of the IPO, “Compartamos is the first but
they won’t be the last”27 (a prediction borne out by ensuing MFI IPOs). The conjunction
of enthusiasm for microfinance in the abstract and outrage over the commercialization of
for-profit microfinance exposes the tensions that arise from competing conceptions of
microfinance both as a poverty-alleviation and development tool and as a lucrative
financial market.
The Andhra Pradesh crisis of 2010 further underscored the significance of these
tensions. In the immediate aftermath of the client suicides, microfinance advocates
quickly wrote off the crisis as an isolated phenomenon resulting from the abusive
practices of a few bad MFIs. It subsequently emerged, however, that some MFI field
agents had pressured highly indebted borrowers to sell daughters into prostitution or

26

Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global
Poverty. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.
27
Quoted in Malkin 2008.
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commit suicide so their families could collect life insurance to pay off their debts.28
Furthermore, some of the largest and most profitable Indian microfinance firms (SKS,
Share, Spandana) were implicated in the crisis,29 vividly illustrating the potential dangers
of large-scale commercial microfinance. The involvement of well-known and highly
profitable players in the microfinance seriously damaged the credibility of the
"microfinance revolution."30
The Andhra Pradesh crisis also called attention to the changing nature of the
microfinance industry's relation to the broader development donor community. Changes
within the industry occurred in conjunction with and in some sense because of large-scale
changes in the theory and practice of development from the 1980s on. In the 1970s and
1980s, there was little overlap between the broader development agenda and the goals of
the microfinance industry. The World Bank and other large donor institutions understood
development in terms of investments in human capital31 as well as physical capital
(especially through investment in large infrastructure projects).32 Neither of these
development emphases generated much interest in microfinance, which most
international donor institutions understood as a fringe form of poverty alleviation. In the
28

Philip Mader, “Rise and Fall of Microfinance in India: The Andhra Pradesh Crisis in Perspective.” In
Strategic Change 2, 2013: 55.
29
Elisabeth Rhyne, "On Microfinance: Who's to Blame for the Crisis in Andhra Pradesh?" Huffington Post,
November 2, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elisabeth-rhyne/on-microfinance-whos-tob_b_777911.html. SKS had also held a highly publicized and controversial IPO earlier in 2010, in which
the company was valued at approximately $1.5 billion (see Chen et al 2010,
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Indian-Microfinance-Goes-Public-The-SKSInitial-Public-Offering-Sep-2010.pdf).
30
In India, the crisis destroyed not only MFIs’ reputations but also their bottom lines. Following reports of
mass suicide, the government of Andhra Pradesh issued an ordinance banning most forms of repayment
collection MFIs practiced. Though in theory the ordinance allowed MFIs to function, in reality most
microfinance institutions simply shut down in Andhra Pradesh, which accounted for 30% of Indian
microfinance (see Mader 2013).
31
Umud Dalgic, "International Expert Organizations and Policy Adoption". Cultural Dynamics. 19 (1)
2007: 5-38.
32
David Williams, International Development and Global Politics: History, Theory and Practice. London:
Routledge, 2012.
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mid- to late-1980s, however, the World Bank and other multinational development
donors began investing heavily in microfinance.33 This surge of interest and investment
in microfinance resulted largely from an ideational shift within donor institutions and
national governments towards neoliberalism.
Microfinance as a development tool complemented neoliberal development
orthodoxy in a number of respects. For neoliberal development theorists, commercial
microfinance offered a new means of bringing the poor within the fold of formal markets,
and one that did not require significant state or civil society expenditures. Neoliberal
development theorists introduced and popularized the notion of the “informal sector,”
arguing that economic activity in the global south largely takes place outside the
boundaries of market capitalism.34 Informal activity, these theorists argued, was both less
efficient than work “inside” capitalism, and further was not exchangeable on the market.
Microeconomic development practice during this period thus concerned itself with
turning dead assets into productive capital by moving them “inside” capitalism.35 By
connecting poor micro-entrepreneurs with financial markets and encouraging them to
invest in their businesses, neoliberal development theorists hoped that microfinance
would contribute to the formalization of economic life throughout the global south.36
This expansion (or formalization) of markets was accompanied by the relegation
of the state to highly delimited roles throughout the Global South. Responding in part to
the failure of Eastern Bloc socialism and the end of the Cold War, and in part to
33

Bateman and Chang 2009.
Dalgic 2007.
35
As evidenced for example by Hernando de Soto's attempt to formalize housing throughout the global
south—see Timothy Mitchell, “The Properties of Markets.” In Do Economists Make Markets? On the
Performativity of Economics, edited by Donald A. MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007.
36
Dichter and Harper 2007. I return to the role of the informal sector in the imagination of microfinance
interventions in Chapter 3.
34
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widespread budget crises, governments and donor institutions introduced “Structural
Adjustment Policies," which entailed the elimination of a vast number of public sector
jobs as well as rollbacks in state-sponsored social welfare programs intended to mitigate
unemployment and poverty. Access to capital became one of the development donor
community's favored solutions to the dislocation caused by wholesale elimination of
social welfare and state protection, and for some states all but entirely substituted for the
provision of social services.37 The development donor community's reliance on
microfinance became especially pronounced as the formal private sector in the Global
South failed to absorb the resulting un- and under-employment of former civil servants.38
For microfinance advocates, the absorption of the poor into formal economic
spaces also made possible their social empowerment. Industry-affiliated think tanks such
as CGAP and the Grameen Foundation disseminated numerous case studies showing how
economic initiative allowed poor women to mitigate patriarchy within their community
or members of untouchable castes to improve their standing.39 Since many critics
attacked neoliberalism for making women and disadvantaged groups bear much of its
cost, the notion that microfinance could simultaneously generate growth and address
social inequality while requiring limited or no state involvement found a great deal of
traction in the development donor community.
The industry's social turn opened up discursive space for the reframing of
microfinance that took place around the turn of the millennium, as “antidevelopment”
movements sought to contest neoliberal development practice. These movements,

37

Dalgic 2007.
Julia Elyachar, "Empowerment Money: The World Bank, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the
Value of Culture in Egypt.” Public Culture. 14 (3): 493-513, 2002.
39
See for instance Robinson 2001.
38
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involving widespread protests such as the “Battle in Seattle” as well as academic and
political contestations of neoliberalism, made “development” anathema to international
organizations. As Julia Elyachar notes, “development...had evidently been given a
discursive burial. No one wanted to defend development anymore—not even the World
Bank.”40 In this context, the project of expanding access to financial services took on new
significance, as microfinance became a way for development donor institutions to
distance themselves from the language of "development.”
Donor institutions, microfinance-oriented think tanks such as CGAP, and
microfinance firms accommodated this new role in part by reframing microfinance
discursively. Language about empowerment, local ownership, and social capital began to
crop up in the microfinance literature. These discursive shifts offer insight into how
microfinance came to operate as what Elyachar terms “the inverse of development.”41 In
particular, the increasing frequency with which language about “social capital” appears in
texts produced by donor institutions speaks to the urgency of incorporating social issues
into mainstream development discourse. Just as the microfinance industry sought to
reframe their mission around empowerment and gender, the World Bank, in its (selfappointed) role as “knowledge bank,” sought to reframe development through the
concept of social capital.42 Social capital continues to play a role in debates about
microfinance and development more broadly,43 while development and research
institutions deploy the concept in various ways.44 More precisely, argue that the
40

Elyachar 2002: 494.
Elyachar 2002: 494.
42
Ben Fine, Social capital versus social theory: political economy and social science at the turn of the
millennium. London: Routledge, 2001.
43
Roy 2010.
44
While Fine argues that the concept has recently (and rapidly) fallen out of fashion at the World Bank, he
notes that the discursive implications remain, particularly in light of the term’s continued usage in debates

41
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microfinance industry and development donor institutions use to the concept of social
capital to coopt antidevelopment movements in order to further neoliberal interventions.
Debates about the role of social capital in development policy have often been
characterized by fierce contestation of—and perhaps outright confusion about—what the
term actually signifies. The World Bank’s 2000-2001 “Voices of the Poor” report, one of
the first Bank documents to deploy the concept, defines "social capital" in terms of "the
benefits of membership within a social network.”45 These networks can entail familial,
professional, or communal ties, and serve as a safeguard against various crises. The 20002001 World Development Report introduces the idea that social capital enables poor
people in the Global South to create economic opportunity out of community ties,
arguing that “social norms and networks are a key form of capital that people can use to
move out of poverty.”46 Here, social relations supplement other forms of capital that the
poor use to mitigate poverty.
Writing against this understanding of social capital, Fine argues that academic and
development institutions deploy the concept in order to bring social and historical issues
into the inherently asocial, ahistorical framework of market individualism. For Fine, this
represents the colonization of the social sciences by neoclassical economics.47 Due in part
to its accommodation of social issues within an essentially economic framework, the
about development and social policy. See Ben Fine, Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving
Badly, London: Pluto Press, 2010.
45
Deepa Narayan-Parker, Can Anyone Hear Us? New York: Published by Oxford University Press for the
World Bank, 2000: 55.
46
World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, Oxford University Press 2001:
10.
47
Fine 2001. In this analysis, social capital owes less to the radical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu than it
does to market individualist thinkers such as Gary Becker, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam. Anthony
Bebbington, writing in response to Fine and other critics of social capital, notes that some development
institutions have used Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital, though he also concedes that this occurs
somewhat rarely and that these institutions are generally relatively weak branches of larger multilateral
institutions (see Anthony Bebbington, "Social Capital and Development Studies II: Can Bourdieu Travel to
Policy?" Progress in Development Studies 7 (2) 2007: 155-162).
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World Bank and other donor institutions deploy social capital discourse strategically in
response to antidevelopment movements. Within the domain of development, critics of
"social capital" argued that its market individualist framing constructed an inherently
entrepreneurial poor, who would respond to the burden of state and market failure
through the maximization of their social capital.48 At the same time, the language of
“solidarity” and “empowerment” that recurs in the social capital literature evokes
“histories of transformative movements that tended to challenge (rather than
accommodate) dominant cultural and political ideologies.”49 More broadly, the
deployment of "social capital" in official development discourse underscores the
development donor community's attempt to balance a newfound emphasis on "social
issues" within a broadly asocial, neoliberal framework.
Bebbington et al., defending the World Bank's understanding of social capital,
argue that while the term may distract from underlying political-economic issues, it
nonetheless serves the valuable purpose of introducing social issues to World Bank
debates.50 Within the World Bank, the introduction of social capital debates responded to
long-standing critiques of development institutions for their failure to focus on social
issues and approach development holistically.51 For critics of social capital, however, the
Bank’s appropriation of this language entailed less an introduction to social issues than a
co-optation of these issues. By taking the social “half-seriously,”52 debating social capital
arguably forestalls macro-level change. This is borne out by the observation that while
48

Margit Mayer and Katharine N Rankin. "Social Capital and (Community) Development: A North/South
Perspective.” Antipode. 34 (4) 2002: 804-808.
49
Rankin 2002: 805.
50
Anthony Bebbington et al, "Exploring Social Capital Debates at the World Bank," Journal of
Development Studies, 40 (5), 2004: 33-64.
51
Bebbington et al 2004.
52
Fine 2001.
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World Bank language has shifted, World Bank policy has not: the increased traction of
social capital in the development community had little bearing on adjustment lending.53
Instead, the deployment of "social capital" coincided with (and, as argued above,
was in some measure responsible for) broader changes in the way development
institutions, academics, and practitioners talked about development. Whereas at the turn
of the millennium antidevelopment and anti-globalization movements agitated against
structural adjustment and massive economic and sociopolitical disparities between Global
North and South, broader debates about development turned to the social aspects of
poverty. The UN’s Millennium Development Goals indicated a fundamental shift in the
conceptualization of poverty, and, along with massive philanthropic involvement from
wealthy donors, created a sense that “ethical capitalism” might rescue development from
itself.54 This also came alongside a reframing of poverty by influential economists such
as Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, who understood it not only in terms of material
deprivation but also insecurity or risk to realization of one’s potential.55
The notion that microfinance enabled community-led development lent the
industry well to a reframing around the concept of social capital. At the level of group
lending, for instance, one microfinance researcher notes that the “use of social capital has
proved an extremely effective form of collateral and exemplifies the importance of trust
and relationships in economic development.”56 In Yunus’ vision, microfinance existed
precisely because the poor had no collateral; the Grameen model depended instead on
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social pressures to enforce repayment.57 In the social capital model of microfinance,
social pressure—the mechanism for enforcing repayment that characterizes Grameen
“clones” around the world58—actually consists of individual borrowers offering social
capital as collateral against potential default.59 In this conception, microfinance involves
poor borrowers risking their social capital in an entrepreneurial manner to generate
growth in both their economic and social capital. Furthermore, as I will argue in Chapter
3, social capital not only reframes development discursively, but also refers to a set of
practices and social technologies that allow the microfinance industry to reshape social
relations in order to realize the kind of subjectivity imagined in microfinance discourse.
The newfound emphasis on social capital has also allowed MFIs to reframe their
mission in terms of empowerment, local solidarity, and grassroots movements. Ananya
Roy notes that at the 2011 Microfinance USA conference, the opening speakers declared
that they were “building a movement, not an industry,”60 arguing that while this claim
perhaps belied the nature of the conference, it also pointed to the industry’s need, in the
wake of the Andhra Pradesh crisis, to reframe itself in non-commercial terms. Yet such
reframing had already been going on for some time before the Andhra Pradesh crisis. The
framing of microfinance had taken a distinctly social turn around the turn of the
millennium.61 In a process analogous to the World Bank’s reframing of “development,”
CGAP reoriented the mission of the microfinance industry around "social" goals. A
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CGAP report from 2003 on the possibility of using microfinance to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals concludes that:
Microfinance is unique among development interventions: it can deliver these
social benefits on an ongoing, permanent basis and on a large scale. Many wellmanaged microfinance institutions throughout the world provide financial
services in a sustainable way, free of donor support. Microfinance thus offers the
potential for a self-propelling cycle of sustainability and massive growth, while
providing a powerful impact on the lives of the poor, even the extremely poor.62
In this analysis, microfinance presents a unique opportunity to address vast disparities
between the Global North and Global South in such areas as health and education, while
also allowing donors to reduce their investments in these areas. This explains in large part
the development donor community’s enthusiasm for the expansion of microfinance. Such
optimism about the potential of microfinance is borne out in policy and scholarly
literature, where microfinance is offered as a potential solution for issues ranging from
Koranic prohibitions on moneylending to the difficulties of post-conflict peace-building.
Yet the tensions arising from the microfinance industry’s self-declared
transformation from industry to movement raised further questions. Critics of the
industry’s use of “social capital” noted that the use of the concept to explain good
microfinance practice and outcomes was highly arbitrary.63 Furthermore, the industry
failed to differentiate between different kinds of social capital and thus ran the risk of
exacerbating hierarchical or oppressive (e.g. patriarchal, classist) social relations.64 As
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Katharine Rankin notes, “common moral frameworks are not in themselves desirable
planning objectives.”65
The 2011 Microfinance USA conference offered the industry an opportunity to
resolve these tensions in light of the Andhra Pradesh crisis. Thus, the industry sought not
only to reframe itself, but also to characterize the problems it faced as a result of “bad”
microfinance. The opening speakers offered a narrative wherein overly commercialized
firms that did not take sufficient account of “culture” had wrought devastation and havoc
on borrower communities. These practices—characterized as usury by Yunus and other
industry members critical of commercialized microfinance—had, in their search for
profits, gone too far in making use of social pressures. The answer, the speakers claimed,
was increased attention to social relations and culture on the part of the MFIs to prevent
the recurrence of "bad" microfinance.66
The irony of this turn lies in the fact that the industry’s reformulation of social
relations into social capital—that is, understanding these relations in terms of
entrepreneurialism and risk-taking—led MFIs to intervene in the social lives of
communities at a larger scale and at a level that made abusive lending practices more
likely. By addressing “social issues” through “social capital,” the microfinance industry
risked creating new forms of risk for borrowers; even Robert Putnam, the famous
theorizer and proponent of social capital, noted that using social capital to these ends
could have catastrophic consequences, as “so strong can be the norm against defection
[from the Rotating Savings and Credit Association] that members on the verge of default
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are reported to have sold daughters into prostitution or committed suicide.”67 This
observation points to the difficulties the industry faces in balancing its claims of
empowering the poor and the intensified forms of risk they ask the poor to take on to
achieve this kind of empowerment.
While Yunus and other microfinance advocates blamed the rash of borrower
suicides on “usury” and “loan sharks,” the conjunction of enthusiasm for microfinance in
the abstract and outrage over the methods MFIs use to enforce repayment underscored
the tensions arising from the competing roles of microfinance as a tool in the fight against
poverty and as a lucrative financial market. Bearing this tension in mind, I examine the
microfinance industry's representations of the poor and deployment of "social capital" not
as "researchers behaving badly"68 but rather in terms of the industry's construction of
entrepreneurial "microfinance subject." In the next chapter, I examine how two
"monuments" of microfinance discourse understand the subjectivities that microfinance
interventions instill in clients. While this analysis identifies divergences between the
approaches these texts take in understanding "microfinance subjects," I also point to key
commonalities between them, most notably the inherent entrepreneurialism of this
subject. Furthermore, I situate this theorization in networks of social forces that actors in
the microfinance industry deploy so that the industry can realize the conditions of its own
possibility.
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Chapter 2: Constituting the "Microfinance Subject"

Despite receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, Muhammad Yunus was by that time
struggling to assert his presence in the movement he had started.69 The “microfinance
revolution” had led to an unprecedented expansion of the microfinance industry,
accomplished in large part through the commercialization of microfinance. Yet certain
microfinance insiders, Yunus among them, argued that commercialization brought about
the very problems that the microfinance industry set out to solve, notably indebtedness,
abuse of borrowers, and new forms of financial and social exclusion.
This rift in the industry, between what Ananya Roy terms the post-Washington
and Bangladesh consensuses on microfinance, characterizes debates about microfinance
to this day. For Roy, the post-Washington consensus celebrates commercial and
“sustainable” (i.e. for-profit) microfinance. Due to this emphasis, actors within this
consensus often argue that sustainability is a necessary first step to outreach, and so will
not loan to the extremely poor or destitute. CGAP organizes this consensus, not only by
producing knowledge about microfinance (in the form of technical reports, field manuals,
country evaluations, and so on) that confirms the value of sustainability, but also by
organizing conferences, holding training sessions, and generally disseminating a form of
“best practices” microfinance consistent with post-Washington consensus values.70
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The Bangladesh consensus, conversely, champions Grameen’s “double bottom
line” of social benefits and economic profitability.71 Aside from creating tangible policy
differences within the microfinance industry, this emphasis led Grameen to pursue a
number of innovations, such as “social business,” wherein businesses reinvest their
profits with a view towards generating social benefits (as opposed to increasing profits).
Though the Bangladesh consensus looked to be getting drowned out by the scale of
investment and institutional support behind the post-Washington consensus sometime in
the early 2000s, the Compartamos IPO and Andhra Pradesh scandal have stoked
skepticism about commercial microfinance, leading many within the industry to search
for alternatives.72
In this chapter, I analyze two “monuments”73 of microfinance discourse that are
representative of the two sides of this split, and have played an important role in
stimulating debate around these topics. The first key text is Marguerite Robinson’s 2001
book The microfinance revolution, a curious blend of history, anthropological findings
about the poor of the global south, microeconomic analysis, and client testimonials to the
power of microfinance. The book was published at the height of enthusiasm about the
power of commercial microfinance, nearly coinciding with the publication of other books
on the subject such as Deborah Drake and Elisabeth Rhyne’s The commercialization of
microfinance.74 The second text is Yunus’ 2007 book Creating a world without poverty:
social business and the future of capitalism. Though the text is primarily concerned with
Yunus’ attempt to pioneer social business, it also examines the “microcredit revolution”
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that inspired his work in social business.75 Published shortly after Yunus won the Nobel
Peace Prize, the text was released at the height of his popular appeal (his acceptance
speech serves as the epilogue to the book).
I depart here from previous analyses of microfinance discourse in not only
analyzing texts and their productive effects, but also situating these texts and the
interventions they make possible within a broader framework of social and technical
forces. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which the microfinance industry
understands poor borrowers and constructs them as economic agents, before exploring in
the next chapter how this form of agency is situated within and constrained by
knowledge, institutions, practices, and technologies. While Robinson’s and Yunus’ texts
both represent “microfinance subjects” with salient commonalities across geographies, I
argue that microfinance as a set of interventions varies locally according to its practice,
mediation, or contestation. Furthermore, I show how this local variation plays out in the
texts, where the theorization of a universal “microfinance subject”76 is rendered unstable
when confronted with what Gibson-Graham aptly terms “the richness of individual
subjects’ economic lives.”77
The Microfinance Revolution revisited
Robinson’s book takes as its point of departure the distinction between the “financial
systems” and “poverty lending” approaches to microfinance.78 Robinson not only
advocates for the financial systems approach, but excludes poverty lending altogether
75
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from her definition of the microfinance revolution with which she opens her book: “The
microfinance revolution is the process—recently begun, but under way in many
developing countries—through which financial services for the economically active poor
are implemented on a large scale by multiple, competing, financially self-sufficient
institutions.”79 Robinson lumps Grameen Bank “and some of its replicators in other
countries” into the category of poverty lending.80 Perhaps attempting to counter the
authority of Yunus, a proponent of the poverty lending approach, Robinson traces the
roots of commercial microfinance to nineteenth-century microlending in Europe. This
history casts doubt on Yunus’ “invention” of microfinance (perhaps rightly so), but it also
downplays the indebtedness of contemporary commercial MFIs to the Grameen model’s
lending circles, which made it possible to scale microfinance services.
While excessive commercialization later became the industry’s favored
explanation of the abuses that caused the Andhra Pradesh scandal,81 the early 2000s were
a time of great enthusiasm for the possibilities of commercial microfinance.82 “Best
practices” in microfinance at the time unreservedly endorsed the financial systems
approach,83 and as financial institutions recognized that microfinance presented a
potentially lucrative new market commercial microfinance spread rapidly. In this context
of unbridled enthusiasm, Robinson’s use of the term “revolution” to describe this
development caught on within the microfinance industry and among its allies.
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This enthusiasm for commercial microfinance coincided with the development
donor community’s shift towards prioritizing social issues in development. Not long
before The microfinance revolution was released, Narayan et al’s Voices of the poor
report had raised hopes among those who sought to reform development institutions such
as the World Bank for taking social issues seriously.84 The title of Robinson’s “Voices of
the clients” section plays on this language, calling attention to the industry’s attempt to
position itself as part of a new way of thinking about development which prioritizes the
needs of the poor. The section, which includes testimonials of microfinance clients from
sixteen different countries, also reinforces the text’s ability to speak authoritatively about
issues concerning the poor.
Robinson notes that “this is not a chapter for statisticians; nothing here is
statistically significant.”85 In an endnote to this section, Robinson offers both a critique of
existing studies of microfinance and a defense of this approach:
As a social anthropologist, I am skeptical about the quality of most studies of the
impact of microfinance on clients’ incomes and enterprises. Such studies are far
more difficult to carry out at a high level of quality than most people realize. I
have been living in villages in different countries when survey teams have come
through asking people about their incomes, assets, debts, participation in
development programs, use of credit, and so on. I have also been there when the
teams leave and the respondents laugh among themselves about what they told the
‘silly people with the pencils’ (as one Indian villager put it).86
Robinson continues by detailing how her approach of soliciting narratives through
successful MFIs allows for a meaningfully diverse representation of client voices.87 Thus,
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the text establishes its authority in this section through asserting its nuanced
understanding of microfinance clients.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, however, this broad array of client voices is
primarily characterized by its uniformity. In her comments preceding the “Voices of the
clients” section, Robinson asserts the fundamental similarity of the poor throughout the
global south in terms of their demand for financial services. Underpinning this claim is
the notion that the poor are inherently entrepreneurial, and only lack access to the right
services to fully realize these qualities:

Coming from widely varying cultures, economies, and environments, there are, of
course, differences among them. But in my experience, market women in Kenya talk
essentially the same business language as market women in Bolivia. Farmers from
India and Mexico share similar concerns about crop finance. And in Dhaka
(Bangladesh) and Jakarta (Indonesia) slum dwellers who want to store their small
savings safely seek a place with many of the same characteristics.88

The poor, then, are characterized by the similarity of their needs, suggesting that largely
similar interventions will work across geographies and urban/rural divisions. That the
poor frame their needs in “business language” further positions microfinance as an
intervention suitable to solving these problems.
Understanding the poor as inherently entrepreneurial also suggests that they are
well suited to microfinance. In a subsection entitled “Do Poor People Understand
Microfinance Products and Services, and Do They Know How to Use Them?” Robinson
argues that because the poor have experience managing scarce resources, they will
skillfully navigate the world of financial services:
Financial experts would be hard pressed to teach people like the Peruvian market
woman, the wife in the rural Bangladeshi farm family, or the Indonesian waitress
88
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how to maximize their resources or how to use available financial services better
than they already do. If financial services suitable for their needs are available,
these people know well how to use them.89
In the text, the poor are necessarily financial experts in their own right—by virtue of the
fact that they are poor. This allays concerns (more or less identical to those Yunus
confronted when he began Grameen Bank) that the poor, and especially the rural poor,
are not “bank-minded.”90
Furthermore, Robinson argues that access to financial services bolsters the selfconfidence of clients and helps them become more independent. For one client, her
entrepreneurial skill allowed her to improve her standing in the community and achieve
her familial goals as a mother:
BR said that she has gained confidence in her roles as wife, mother, and
businesswoman. “Earlier I could not even express myself or stand before people.”
Now she has set aside bricks to build a house, she pays the children’s school fees
from the brickmaking business, and she and her husband have plans to build a
pub. “I have a happy marriage and my husband respects me. My children are also
happy and respect me because I can provide for them and feed them.”91
Here, the text shows a microentrepreneur using the MFI’s services to realize her
subjectivity, offering not only economic empowerment but also giving her the confidence
to “stand before people.” Throughout the “Voices of the Clients” section, poor people
from around the world establish their agency through microfinance.
Yet not all the poor are, in Robinson’s view, capable of becoming "microfinance
subjects." Rather, she distinguishes between the “economically active” and “extremely”
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poor. At the level of MFI policy, the most obvious manifestation of this distinction is that
the financial systems approach “advocates commercial microfinance for the economically
active poor and other, subsidized and charitable nonfinancial methods of reducing
poverty and creating jobs for the extremely poor.”92 The distinction between these two
kinds of poor people points to a need for a specialized intervention for each group (that
is, microfinance for the economically active poor and charity for the extremely poor). As
Robinson puts it, “the poorest of the poor should not be the responsibility of the financial
sector.”93
Robinson notes, however, that the distinction between the economically active
and extremely poor “is not precise.” While the term “extremely poor” generally refers to
those make less than 75 cents a day, Robinson understands the “extremely poor”
specifically as those who either cannot access employment or otherwise are otherwise
unable to work (due for instance to displacement, social exclusion, or disability). 94
Robinson qualifies this distinction in two ways. First, the extremely poor can in some
instances become economically active, or vice-versa.95 Membership in one of the groups
is not so much tied to the individual characteristics of a poor person as to situational
factors such as indebtedness, illness, or lack of access to employment. If circumstances
change, the text suggests, an “extremely” poor person could transition into economic
activity. Second, the economically active poor do not always meet all the criteria
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Robinson offers. Rather, they are simply those who meet some of these benchmarks and
are considered “creditworthy.”96
In one of her footnotes elaborating on the distinction between the economically
active and extremely poor, Robinson clarifies that this categorization draws from Henry
Mayhew’s categorization of poverty in London Labour and the London Poor:
Mayhew’s (1968 [1861], vol. 4, pp. 22–23) classic four-volume study of poverty
in 19th century London remains the most comprehensive source on different
kinds of poverty, shown from the point of view of the poor themselves. Mayhew
divides the population of Great Britain into four categories: those who will work,
those who cannot work, those who will not work (vagrants, beggars, criminals),
and those who need not work. In the terminology used here, the extremely poor
would include many in Mayhew’s second category and some in his third category.
Access to formal sector commercial microfinance could help the economically
active poor in his first category and some of those in his second category.97
In actuality, Robinson’s categories as deployed in the text owe more to the later work of
Charles Booth, a late-Victorian era theorist who revised Mayhew’s categorization and
opted for a distinction between the “very poor” and the “laboring” poor. For Booth, as for
Mayhew, such a distinction implied a moral judgment against those who would not work-a category curiously absent from Robinson’s analysis.98 In her construction of a hardworking, entrepreneurial poor, Robinson downplays the “undeserving” poor, who are
subsumed by the category of “those who cannot work.”
This distinction breaks down altogether when Robinson presents the stories of
individual borrowers. The following interview between an elderly microfinance client
and a representative of the Bangladeshi MFI that serves her, which appears in the
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“Voices of the Clients” section, offers an account of an extremely poor client engaging in
economic activity:
AF: As you see, I am a widow. I have no son anymore. If I don’t save, what will
happen to me when I can’t work anymore?
SKS: Would you mind telling me what is your work?
AF: You see, I am an old woman. I can’t work. So I go from door to door.
SKS: Please don’t mind, do you mean you are a beggar?
AF: What else can an old woman like me do?
SKS: Is it hard work?
AF: Not very. I go out only a few hours, and I don’t go every day. It is enough.
The people are good. I don’t need anything but food.
SKS: Even so, you save more than some working people do!
AF: Of course. They have jobs and sons. They don’t need to save like I do, do
they?99
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Robinson’s inclusion of this interview, at least from
the point of view of the debate between the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps, is
that in this analysis the extremely poor benefit more from microfinance than do the
economically active poor. More immediately, however, this interview also underscores
the instability of the distinction between the economically active and inactive. To wit, a
beggar who fails to meet Robinson’s criteria for economic activity due to her inability to
obtain formal employment is not only manifestly economically active, but noteworthy in
this regard. Furthermore, Robinson asserts that the categories of extremely and
economically active poor are not fixed—that is, that they denote conditions and not states
of being, and as such extremely poor individuals can become economically active. It is
unclear, however, how this can happen except through economic activity.
In spite of the tensions in the text, however, The Microfinance Revolution
became a touchstone for debates within and about the microfinance industry. Meanwhile
Yunus, with the ascendance of CGAP and the financial services approach to
99
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microfinance, was becoming a more marginal figure in the industry. While the
microfinance subject constructed by Yunus’ text shares key attributes with Robinson’s
“economically active” poor, Yunus also attempts to put his own stamp on the
“microcredit revolution.”
Yunus: Creating a world without poverty
While The Microfinance Revolution frames microfinance as only one poverty-reduction
tool among many, Yunus’ book holds higher aspirations for the "missing piece of the
capitalist system."100 For Yunus, a university economist by training, the inspiration for
microcredit resulted from his first-hand experience with market failure during the
Bangladesh famine of 1974. Working on an irrigation project in a rural village, he
concluded that the degree to which the challenge the villagers he worked with faced was
not so much a lack of productivity but indebtedness due to abusive lending practices by
moneylenders. Yunus organized a project with his students to hand out small loans to
victims of the moneylenders. The villagers paid these loans back, and Yunus' experiment
with microcredit had begun.
Yet in Yunus' account, providing credit to the poor is not so much a question of
correcting market failure as fundamentally reshaping capitalism. Integral to Yunus’
notion of microfinance is the concept of access to financial services as a human right. By
his own account, local bankers scorned his efforts to provide credit to the poor. Yunus
argues that this attitude entails "a worldwide system of apartheid."101 As Ananya Roy
notes:
this approach sees microfinance as explicitly distinct from, and even opposed to,
commercial banking. Yunus has repeatedly emphasized that microfinance is not
100
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banking at the bottom of the socio-economic structure; instead it is about turning
banking on its head. In short, it is about remaking capitalism.102
From its inception, Grameen prioritized poverty-reduction and low interest rates over
financial sustainability. Yunus argued that while Grameen was sustainable, international
aid should nonetheless be mobilized to expand access to donor-subsidized microfinance.
Recognizing better than most the division in the microfinance industry between
the Bangladesh and post-Washington consensuses, Yunus addresses this question in the
text. Crucially, however, he reframes this division in terms of interest rates charged to
borrowers. He offers a categorization that distinguishes between "poverty-focused" and
"profit-maximizing" microcredit institutions.103 Whereas Robinson argues that the latter
can more sustainably address poverty, Yunus argues that their interest rates are
"moneylenders' territory," and that furthermore "because of the high interest they charge,
these programs cannot be viewed as poverty-focused but rather are commercial
enterprises whose main objective appears to be earning large profits for shareholders or
other investors." Yunus concludes that such institutions should not properly be
considered MFIs. Thus, while Robinson argues that the "poverty-lending" approach is not
part of the microfinance revolution, Yunus places profit-maximizing microcredit
institutions outside of the microfinance industry as a whole. Leveraging his credentials as
the founder of contemporary microcredit, he offers a parting shot at the post-Washington
consensus on microfinance: "microcredit was created to protect the people from
moneylenders, not to create more moneylenders."104
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In spite of this dispute over how microfinance institutions should approach
lending to the poor, however, Yunus' text shares with Robinson's a language of
entrepreneurialism. While Yunus remains skeptical about unfettered capitalism in its
current manifestation, he insists on the value of hard work for the poor to lift themselves
out of poverty: "Grameen Bank offers the poor not handouts or grants but credit--loans
they must repay, with interest, through their own productive work."105 Like Robinson, he
depicts the poor as entrepreneurs whose work will flourish within the right structures. He
also echoes her emphasis on economic activity, quoting from a letter sent from an
American friend who visited rural Bangladesh and called it "an incredible bee hive [sic]
of economic activity...in practically every house or yard you pass, you see people at
work, making or fixing or preparing things for trade." This scene offers a visible contrast
to the economically depressed counties of rural America, the friend believes, where
economic activity is indiscernible. The presence of the entrepreneurial poor of the Global
South106 remains a distinct aspect of microfinance discourse across consensuses.
Superficially, Yunus' treatment of "economic activity" would seem to be more
encompassing than Robinson's. Grameen, he notes, has a microlending program
specifically for beggars, which charges no interest and allows them to establish their own
repayment schedule. Such an arrangement violates a number of tenets of the financial
services approach to microfinance, notably that such loans are not "sustainable" and
because such beggars fall outside the bounds of "economic activity" in Robinson's terms.
Yunus' program, however, illustrates the instability of this binary between the
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economically active and extremely poor, since many of these borrowers use these loans
to sell goods door-to-door, and some (Yunus estimates as many as ten percent) eventually
graduate and start taking out larger loans at interest. The poor, for Yunus, are united by
their entrepreneurialism.
Yunus' description of Grameen's social agenda suggests that Grameen also
provides a structure within which borrowers create and perform an entrepreneurial
identity. This performance most notably manifests itself in the "Sixteen Decisions"
adopted by Grameen's borrowers. Some of the Decisions encourage borrowers to be
frugal ("6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our
expenditures"), while others pertain to health, housing, and sanitation. Such Decisions
offer a sense of the byproducts of a prosperous, growing community. Most explicitly,
however, a few decisions appeal to the need to work hard to achieve prosperity and
economic growth, as a responsibility to borrowers' families and communities: "1. The
four principles of Grameen Bank--Discipline, Unity, Courage, and Hard Work--we shall
follow and advance in all walks of our lives. 2. We shall bring prosperity to our familes."
Decision 13 most clearly reflects the entrepreneurial nature of the Decisions: "For higher
income we shall collectively undertake bigger investments." Grameen actively seeks to
instill these principles in its borrowers, for as Yunus notes, "every new members of the
bank is expected to learn the Sixteen Decisions and to pledge to follow them."107 Yunus
shows that Grameen not only offers resources to poor entrepreneurs, but also creates
more entrepreneurs from within the ranks of the poor.
It is worth remembering that for Yunus, this creation of new entrepreneurs is also
made possible by a new kind of institution attempting to create a new kind of economics.
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While the emphasis on "higher income" through "bigger investments" might suggest that
Yunus views capital accumulation as an end in itself, he voices skepticism at several
points in the text on precisely this question, arguing that people are not motivated only by
the desire for profit and that the structure of capitalism needs to incorporate social
concerns. In seeking to remake capitalism "from the bottom up," he suggests that
microcredit is the beginning of a larger process of rethinking capitalist institutions--the
next step of which he hopes to realize with social business. Paradoxically, then, Yunus'
book is saturated both with the rhetoric of the entrepreneurial poor and admonitions of
the capitalist system for not offering an outlet for such entrepreneurial energy.
Encountering antidevelopment
In this section I analyzed two "monuments" of microfinance discourse to examine how
they mapped onto debates within the industry. The texts in question represent two
divergent perspectives on microfinance--what I have opted to call the Bangladesh and
post-Washington consensuses, following Ananya Roy--though what distinguishes these
approaches is also a matter of contention within the texts themselves. Yet in spite of these
differences, both texts engage in the construction of an entrepreneurial poor able to grow
their assets if given the chance.
Paradoxically, this appeal to market values--rooted at least partly in Victorian-era
beliefs about the deserving poor, as I note in reference to Robinson's distinction between
the "extremely" and "economically active" poor--serves to counter antidevelopment
movements by emphasizing poor entrepreneurs and their rootedness in communities,
even as the MFIs simultaneously engage in the process of constituting these
entrepreneurs. Elyachar's apt observation that "microinformality is where
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antidevelopment found its development home"108 underscores the microfinance industry's
success in framing entrepreneurialism in social terms. The monuments in question serve
not only to construct the poor in particular ways, but also are engaged in producing a
particular kind of economic rationality for poor borrowers and for the development donor
community.
The texts diverge, however, in terms of how subjects can realize this agency and
what conditions subjects must escape to do so. Yunus' text frames his experiment with
and innovations in microlending as a response to the historically longstanding problem of
predatory moneylending. Addressing the power imbalance between moneylenders and
poor women--and the ultimate transformation of the latter into microentrepreneurs-assumes a centrality to the "microcredit revolution." Yunus' text critiques the practices of
commercialized MFIs for recreating the exploitation inherent in moneylending under the
guise of microfinance. Yunus' narrative, then, underscores not so much the problem of
the poor's lack of access to capital, as the need to change the particular social and power
relations conditioning such access.
Robinson's text refers only in passing to the legacy of moneylending, perhaps for
fear of inviting the comparison that Yunus draws between commercial MFIs with high
interest rates and usury. In her text, technical--rather than social--barriers prevent the
provision of formal, secure financial services to the poor.109 In arguing that the key
condition preventing the entrepreneurial poor from expanding their economic and social
capital is lack of access to capital, which in turn would allow "microfinance subjects" to
subvert oppressive social relations within their communities, Robinson's text inverts
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Yunus' narrative about access to capital and exploitation. In this view, informal
moneylending becomes an important predecessor to the contemporary microfinance
industry, that contemporary MFIs, through superior techniques, have transcended.
This rift over the nature of the "microfinance subject" plays out not only at the
level of discourse, but in terms of the technologies, coalitions, cultural norms, and
personnel the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps deploy and assemble in attempting
to produce this subject. These divergent assemblages, in turn, bear on how the
"microfinance subject" relates to the MFI and thus on how she is produced. In what
follows, I examine the process by which actors in the microfinance industry equip clients
to become "microfinance subjects." Yet the production of the microfinance subject is not
so straightforward as her theorization, and in this vein I show that crises in microfinance
demonstrate the limitations of the industry's self-understanding.
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Chapter 3: Economic Performativity, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development
Nearly every economist I meet asks the same question: if formal sector
microfinance is profitable, and if there is high demand, why has the demand not
been met? The primary answer is the lack of appropriate and efficient financial
technology and the lack of information that prevailed until recently.110
Economic Performativity Theory
The two "monuments" of the microfinance literature examined in Chapter 2 offer a
distinction between the ways in which the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps
construct microfinance subjectivity. Yet while these subjectivities differ in certain
respects, the texts also point to certain commonalities intrinsic to the industry's
imagination of the "microfinance subject." In both Yunus' and Robinson's texts, the poor
of the Global South intuitively understand finance, work hard, and use their assets
masterfully to manage their household income and grow their capital. Both texts argue
that good MFIs provide the capital necessary for the entrepreneurial poor to reach their
full potential.
Yet there is also a tension in this narrative, for much of the debate over "best
practices" in the microfinance industry concerns how to ensure client responsibility and
repayment. In a 1995 training session organized by USAID Cairo, a consultant explained
the value of understanding culture in ensuring high repayment rates among microcredit
borrowers: "In every culture there is something that works, and the thing is to find out
what that is. Is it the headman, the religious leader, community pressure, or the police?
Find out what it is, and use it."111 My own exposure to the disciplinary apparatus of MFIs
came in 2012, when a microfinance practitioner teaching a class for my study abroad
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program in Senegal defended his decision to have insolvent borrowers thrown in jail,
arguing that it was the only way to prevent widespread defaults. Both cases speak to the
disciplinary power necessary to constitute new entrepreneurs from the ranks of the poor
in the Global South.
Following Lasse Henriksen's observation that "questions of epistemic domination
and control in the performativity of economics have been at the periphery of the narrower
performativity research agenda,"112 I attempt to reconcile extant critiques of microfinance
with a performative perspective on the microfinance industry. I argue there remains a gap
between the theorization of an entrepreneurial poor in the texts I have analyzed and the
more ambiguous realities of microfinance practice. In this chapter, I review selections
from the literature on economic performativity theory in order to reframe the relation
between microfinance theory and practice in terms of its mediation along the lines of
culture, knowledge, power, institutions, personnel, and technologies. Furthermore, I
argue that this mediation does not always produce "felicitous" results.113 Rather, events
such as the Andhra Pradesh crisis and the Compartamos IPO, as well as widespread cooptation of MFI projects by poor clients who repurpose them for their own needs,114 point
to the limitations of the industry's understanding of the agencements at play.
Economic performativity theory takes as its point of departure the premise that
economics is not a science that observes something external to itself, but rather is
implicated in creating the worlds that it describes. In this view, as Timothy Mitchell aptly
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puts it, "the effectiveness of economics rests on what it does, not on what it says."115 This
perspective suggests that economic theory is at its core political, for, as Mitchell notes,
in helping to constitute the apparent border between the market and the
nonmarket, economics contributes to the work of sociotechnical mechanisms that
reorganize how people live, the political claims they can make, and the assets they
can control.116
Economic interventions, then, are inherently normative and political projects. David
Williams' critique of the World Bank anticipates this claim in noting that IOs and NGOs
"are engaged in very intrusive interventions in the pursuit of the creation of rational
subjectivity."117 Such a process is analogous to the way in which MFIs attempt to create
microfinance subjects through the disciplinary mechanisms of social pressure or police
force.
Yet the performative view of economics does not equate economic theory with a
self-fulfilling prophecy, which would suggest that any new theory is equally well suited
to reshape economic life. Rather, the particular "sociotechnical agencements" at play-that is, different materialities, social forces, ideologies, arrangements of power, and so
on--contribute to whether and to what degree a theory can contribute to "the construction
of the reality it describes."118 In order for economic performativity theory to contribute to
an understanding of economic life it must be understood not merely as a critique of
economic theory, for "to view economics as a body of ideas is far too narrow, for
economics also consists of people, skills, datasets, techniques, procedures, tools, and so
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on.”119 This approach avoids the reductionism of viewing economics as a totalizing,
misrepresentative discourse and rather situates it among other productive forces that give
a fuller picture of--to return again to Gibson-Graham's formulation--the "the richness of
individual subjects’ economic lives."120
Understanding economics not as a science studying phenomena external to it but
rather as a field where actors deploy competing forms of expertise, authority, legitimacy,
and ownership to reshape economic life means also viewing the project of "development"
in these terms. In this vein, Timothy Mitchell's essay "The Properties of Markets"
reframes Hernando de Soto's work on the formalization of property rights in the Global
South in terms of the political and sociotechnical interventions it makes possible.
Specifically, Mitchell takes issue with de Soto's argument that the "secret" to successful
capitalism lies in instituting formal property mechanisms at the level of the state. By
turning "dead" (informal) assets into "live" (formal) capital, de Soto argues, the poor of
the Global South can use their assets, in particular their homes, as collateral with which
they can access the credit economy. For de Soto, this transition makes greater capital
accumulation possible for the poor and ultimately paves the way for the success of
markets in spaces that de Soto believes currently fall "outside" the boundaries of
capitalism.121 Yet as de Soto notes, this reorganization of economic life necessitates a
redistribution of risk that actually makes the poor of the Global South less secure.122 I
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will return shortly to the theme of redistributing risk in the context of the microfinance
industry.
Mitchell's insight is to identify the ways in which de Soto's work is a
"(mis)representation,"123 while also taking seriously the productive power of his ideas
and the agencements underpinning them. De Soto has effectively built a consensus
behind his theories through his think-tank, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD).
Through de Soto's connections with influential policymakers and neoliberal theorists, the
ILD has obtained bid-free contracts from heads of state in the Global South to implement
his prescribed policies.124 De Soto's arguments also resonate with the development donor
community and international organizations in part, Mitchell argues, because they deploy
the trope of the poor as entrepreneurs lacking only the right structural conditions to
succeed.125 These political, social, and discursive conditions underpin an agencement that
allows for the realization of de Soto's model in spite of academic economists' concerns
over its empirical rigor.
The economic performativity theory literature offers a new perspective on debates
about "development" and microfinance that take for granted the microfinance industry's
discourse of the entrepreneurial poor, or interrogate it solely in terms of its value as a
(mis)representation. Just as sociotechnical agencements underpin de Soto's theorization
of an entrepreneurial poor, other discourses, coalitions, techniques, and personnel form
agencements that mediate the theorization and constitution of the "microfinance subject."
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Furthermore, while much of this mediation is "felicitous" (that is, the conditions required
for the realization of the world the industry is predicated on are met), I argue that crises
such as the mass suicides in Andhra Pradesh can be attributed to the limits of the
industry's understanding of these agencements. My goal in this analysis is not to identify
every actor, technology, or social force at play in microfinance agencements, but rather to
reformulate themes that I have already examined in terms of the economic performativity
theory literature. In what follows, I first revisit the debate between the post-Washington
and Bangladesh consensuses on microfinance, outlined in Chapter 2. I then turn from the
larger IOs that generate microfinance knowledge to the MFIs that deploy it in order to
produce "microfinance subjects." Having outlined the role that institutions perform in this
agencement, I review the technologies that MFIs deploy in attempting to produce
"microfinance subjects," paying particular attention to the role of "social capital." In
conclusion, I examine the implications of a performative understanding of microfinance,
calling attention to the reallocation and intensification of risk for the "microfinance
subject."
Constituting the "Microfinance Subject"
While Chapters 1 and 2 underscored the fracture within the microfinance industry
between the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps, the attempt to constitute an
entrepreneurial "microfinance subject" remains a relatively constant facet of the literature
on microfinance practice across this divide. This process resonates with critiques of the
role NGOs play in forming what David Williams terms "liberal subjectivity" among the
poor of the Global South, speaking to the power institutions wield in making micro-level
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interventions regardless of their appeal to the subjects in question.126 The constitution of
such subjects, as Tom Young puts it, entails "programming, not propositions."127 Young
and Williams' observations point to a need for greater attention to the processes by which
MFIs must equip the poor of the Global South with technologies, skills, languages, and
resources to realize a particular form of "calculative agency."128
Yet the "liberal subjectivity" identified by Young and Williams, characterized
primarily by its internalization of and adherence to neoliberal norms, does not capture the
specificity of the subjectivities129 that MFIs attempt to produce. Rather, four key traits of
the "microfinance subject" recur in the microfinance literature. First, she is
"tremendously entrepreneurial."130 Having been forged by the experience of managing
scarce resources, she uses her assets masterfully to expand her microenterprise and
accumulate economic and social capital. Second, the "microfinance subject" is based on
the gendered model of "rational economic woman." This belief in the "hidden
entrepreneurial qualities" of the third-world woman means that the majority of
microfinance loans are made to women.131 Much of the literature on the social benefits of
microfinance underscores the benefits communities in the Global South could reap from
women realizing this kind of agency. Third, the microfinance subject remains poor only
because structural conditions prevent her from realizing her full potential (though
precisely which structural conditions the industry must remedy remains a point of
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contention across the camps). Finally, the "microfinance subject" is fundamentally
similar around the world: she speaks the same "business language," faces the same
obstacles, and is amenable to the same interventions.132
Crucially, however, the industry also predicates much of its "best practices" on
the notion that the "microfinance subject" does not exist prior to microfinance. David
Williams' claim that NGO and IO interventions in the Global South constitute an attempt
to instill "liberal subjectivity" (rather than presupposing its existence) suggests that MFIs
must constitute "microfinance subjects" in order for the industry to realize the conditions
of its own success.
Furthermore, while the "microfinance subject" theorized by the industry remains
generally constant across fractures, the Bangladesh and post-Washington take different
approaches to realizing her production, creating competing agencements that differ along
the lines of the discourses, coalitions, personnel, and technologies they deploy. In what
follows, I revisit aspects of the microfinance industry that I have touched on previously,
and reframe them in terms of their role in microfinance agencements, with special
attention to the roles of the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps in creating
competing agencements and the various felicity conditions underpinning these
agencements.
Coalition-building and knowledge production are integral processes in the
constitution of both camps. For the post-Washington consensus, CGAP plays a crucial
role in organizing and equipping other actors within this camp. CGAP tracks supply and
demand for microfinance funding through a repository known as the Microfinance

132

See the analysis of Robinson 2001 in Chapter 2 on the question of the similarity of microfinance clients
throughout the Global South.

46

Informations Exchange (or "the MIX").133 Given the microfinance industry's reputation
for being fractured, poorly defined, and difficult to monitor, the MIX serves the important
function of creating a clear and accessible market for microfinance funding. CGAP also
produces microfinance "experts" with the appropriate skills and values through the
Boulder Institute, a training institute for microfinance professionals to learn industry
"best practices."134 CGAP supplements the creation of skilled practitioners with
voluminous knowledge production. The production of experts and expertise allows for
the creation of a market for microfinance.
Private actors also play an important role in equipping post-Washington
consensus MFIs with the tools to commercialize. Aitken identifies three processes that
enable what he terms "micro/financialization," namely valuation, intermediation, and
securitization.135 Valuation refers to the processes that establish the value of
microfinancial assets. Some MFIs--notably Compartamos136--have established this
valuation through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), transferring ownership of these MFIs
into the hands of "private financial agents."137 Intermediation, in turn, refers to the
processes by which financial agents can access MFIs as formal, investable objects. Firms
often accomplish this through the use of "micro-credit investment vehicles," or MIVs,
which in turn rely on networks of financial partners, charities, and microcredit recipients.
MIVs, then, allow investors to "access micro-borrowers as an increasingly mainstream
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financial asset."138 Finally, securitization allows MFIs to disperse their risk throughout
markets through, for instance, Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). These techniques
reflect the importation of financial technique from the Anglo-American "center" of
finance to the "edges" of the global financial economy, enabling the dispersion of risk
MFIs take on in lending to the poor into formal financial markets. Furthermore, MFIs that
began as non-profit organizations have, by holding IPOs and offering CDOs, transformed
into commercialized MFIs accessible as mainstream financial assets.139
Commercialization occurred, then, not so much as a result of "consensus" but rather due
to the establishment of techniques that allowed Bangladesh camp MFIs to rapidly
commercialize by transforming how they disperse risk, and the creation of a regularized,
formalized market that made commercial MFIs accessible assets.140
The Bangladesh camp, in turn, counters these techniques of commercialization
with agencements more conducive to their model of microfinance. While CGAP's role as
a "clearing house"141 for microfinance research has no exact corollary within the
Bangladesh consensus, the Grameen Foundation produces microfinance knowledge and
technologies with a view towards building coalitions around their approach to
microfinance. Thus, the Grameen Foundation not only advocates for a greater emphasis
on social issues in microfinance, but also measures the social impact of investments
through the Progress Out of Poverty Index.142 This approach differs starkly from the postWashington camp approach to social issues, which views them as secondary to the
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business of microfinance. Furthermore, the Grameen Foundation produces knowledge
centered on Bangladesh consensus values, particularly with regards to the social impact
of investment. This knowledge production has allowed Grameen to build a network of
international organizations, MFIs, NGOs, and private corporations143 around the
Bangladesh consensus on microfinance.
Although both camps must create markets for microfinance, their approaches to
creating these markets differ. The agencement underpinning the post-Washington
approach to microfinance includes commercialization as part of its network, while
commercialization itself relies upon a network of techniques, skills, and personnel.
Bangladesh consensus microfinance, in turn, contests the process of commercialization,
and relies upon different networks--for instance, coalitions with governmental and
nongovernmental entities that offer cheap publically or privately subsidized loans to
Bangladesh camp MFIs--to bring microfinance into the fold of formal, accessible
financial markets.144 Within both camps, then, MFIs disperse some of the risk inherent in
microlending onto other actors--and yet, in both camps, the "microfinance subject"
herself also shares the risk that MFIs create. This involves the creation of different
microfinance riskscapes, or ways in which the industry capitalizes on and relates to risk.
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In what follows, I explore the relation between the market for this form of risk and its
bearing on individual clients.
Different markets for microfinance produce different relations between MFIs and
subjects and different subjectivities. Young's argument that NGOs in the Global South
are engaged in "programming"145 also pertains to the work of MFIs in constituting
"microfinance subjects." Grameen's "Sixteen Decisions"146 offers an example of the
MFI's attempt to make clients internalize (literally, through memorization and repetition)
entrepreneurial values. Yet the Sixteen Decisions also demonstrate how the constitution
of "microfinance subjects" differs from the creation of the "liberal subjectivity" Williams
identifies, since many of the Decisions address social issues (poor health, unsanitary
living conditions, lack of access to education, and so on) that relate to the "microfinance
subject" not only as an entrepreneur but also as a provider for her family and
community.147
There is, however, a rift here as well in terms of how Bangladesh and postWashington MFIs seek to equip their subjects. Post-Washington camp MFIs prioritize
both outreach (offering microfinance to as many potential clients as possible) and
providing as broad an array of financial services as possible to clients, especially savings.
Bangladesh camp MFIs, on the other hand, often provide skills training to clients in their
formation as entrepreneurs, as well as services relating to their social and povertyalleviation goals, such as family planning and working with clients to access education.148
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Furthermore, while some Bangladesh camp MFIs have moved towards offering a broader
array of financial services as well, the Bangladesh consensus prioritization of credit
remains evident in Yunus' reformulation of the "microfinance revolution" as the
"microcredit revolution." The divergent skills and services with which MFIs equip
"microfinance subjects" reflect the divergent ways in which the Bangladesh and postWashington camps on microfinance imagine their clients' subjectivities, and especially
what clients must escape to realize this subjectivity. Post-Washington camp MFIs
prioritize the provision of financial services and outreach since within this consensus the
"microfinance subject" suffers primarily due to her lack of access to capital, whereas for
Bangladesh camp MFIs, alleviating not only poverty (through financial services) but also
its consequences (through social services) remains central to its model.
The differences in how the Bangladesh and post-Washington camps imagine
microfinance subjectivity is reflected not only in the imagination of clients, but also in
the relation between the "microfinance subject" and the MFI field agent charged with
enforcing repayment. In the case of Grameen, field agents supplement (or, in cases where
individual contracts are offered in lieu of group lending, replace) the social pressure of
lending circles. Yet Grameen's employees also monitor clients' adherence to the social
norms and objectives set out in the Sixteen Decisions. Grameen thus rewards staff
members based on whether their clients meet certain social thresholds, such as keeping
their children in school.149 Post-Washington MFIs, conversely, often hire "external
agents"150 to recruit new clients and enforce repayment, and in some cases these agents'
compensation is tied to repayment rates. Furthermore, critics have called attention to the
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social harm of the most extreme forms of enforcement practiced by commercial MFIs,
such as pressuring borrowers to commit suicide or sell children into prostitution to pay
off debts. The difference in how MFIs imagine microfinance subjectivity creates a stark
contrast in the kind of personnel MFIs deploy to enforce repayment, and how these
personnel relate to clients and their families.
Divergent constructions of microfinance subjectivity also play into the techniques
MFIs deploy to discipline subjects. Both the "best practices" and critical literature on
microfinance have devoted some attention to how MFIs ensure high repayment rates and
instill entrepreneurial identity and values. While I argued in Chapter 1 that the concept of
social capital reframes financial interventions in terms of social issues, I now turn to the
ways in which "social capital" refers to a set of technologies and practices the
microfinance industry uses to realize the conditions of its own possibility. Previous
debates about microfinance and social capital have revolved around the question of
whether the concept of "social capital" has analytical value for describing successful
microfinance programs and the social relations that MFIs draw upon to establish their
practices.151 Yet these debates often overlook the productive aspects of social capital
discourse and what it makes possible as a concept as well as part of the sociotechnical
agencements underpinning microfinance.
This inattention to the role of "social capital" in microfinance agencements is
especially important because this role has changed over the course of the industry's
expansion. Yunus' key innovation in making microfinance a global industry, as noted in
Chapter 1, was arranging borrowers in a group where access to credit for any one
151
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member was contingent upon repayment from the entire group, thus reconfiguring social
norms in relation to lending circles. It was the transformation of social relations into a
form of collateral known as "social capital" that so many Grameen "clones" emulated in
the 1980s and 1990s, allowing the fledgling industry to rapidly scale up.152 After the
development donor community's turn to social issues around the turn of the millennium,
microfinance advocates reframed this disciplinary mechanism in terms of social capital:
now, microentrepreneurs offered "social capital" as a form of collateral.153 Paradoxically,
this formulation coincided with a move in the industry, during the mid 2000s, away from
group lending and towards individual contracts.154
Yet, as demonstrated by the behavior of MFI collectors during the Andhra
Pradesh crisis, social pressures and the threat of losing respect and standing in a
community--concepts pioneered by Yunus in order to ensure the success of his lending
circles--continued to play a role in enforcing individual repayment. Egregious and
predatory MFI behavior (for instance, encouraging insolvent borrowers to commit suicide
so a MFI could collect the life insurance) was made possible in part by conceiving of
social relations as a form of collateral that MFIs could use to ensure repayment as long as
they pulled the proper cultural strings. These technologies serve to constitute and
discipline "microfinance subjects" through the strategic deployment and reshaping of
social relations. Yunus' appeal to communal pressure to ensure client honesty and
frugality in his account of Grameen's expansion is just one example of how a MFI can
capitalize on cultural knowledge.
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The practice of finding "what works"155 to enforce repayment within a given
culture or community allows MFIs to deploy local knowledge as a potentially coercive
disciplinary mechanism. The role of "social capital" in enabling particular lending
technologies shows that the standard critical approach to the concept of social capital-that it distorts or misrepresents social relations--overlooks the need to understand the
concept in terms of its productive implications within the agencements underpinning
microfinance. Though the concept has been widely discarded in terms of its analytical
value by World Bank theorists, the microfinance industry continues to use it to describe a
set of practices and outcomes.156 A performative approach to the role "social capital"
plays in the agencement of microfinance requires recognizing, then, that it results not
only from "researchers behaving badly,"157 but also from the creation of technologies that
allow the industry to realize the conditions of its own possibility.
In terms of building institutional support within microfinance agencements,
"social capital" also provides a discursive framework for understanding microfinance and
building broad coalitions behind different forms of the "microfinance revolution." The
reformulation of financial services in terms of social issues has brought IOs whose
purviews expand well beyond development (notably the United Nations, which declared
2005 the International Year of Microcredit) into networks and coalitions of microfinance
actors. By emphasizing the social impacts of microfinance, the language of social capital
also helped the microfinance industry--and even large development institutions like the
World Bank--counter antidevelopment movements.
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Furthermore, as noted earlier in this chapter, using "social capital" as collateral
requires no physical collateral, thus making it possible for financial institutions to offer
credit to poor borrowers in the Global South. As Ananya Roy notes, this innovation
represents the creation of a new "riskscape;"158 or, to put it in performative terms, using
technologies that deploy "social capital" allow banks and financial firms to capitalize on
new forms of risk and discipline clients who do not adhere to the industry's construction
of a "microfinance subject." Once this riskscape had been opened, MFIs explored new
ways of enforcing high repayment rates, such as through the use of "culture" and police
force. These technologies also allowed for rapid expansion and commercialization of the
industry, as financial backers were more willing to back MFIs when it became clear that
MFIs could enforce repayment. "Social capital" thus linked to another set of technologies
allowing MFIs to diffuse the risks of microlending.
Yet examining the role "social capital" has played in the microfinance industry
also offers instances of what Donald MacKenzie refers to as "counter-performativity,"159
or in Callon's terms a crisis in the agencements underpinning microfinance.160 Using the
technologies of "social capital" to enforce repayment also allowed for MFIs to intervene
in ways that, as I argued in Chapter 1, ultimately made abusive lending practices more
likely. For all his protesting about interest rates and the "new usury" of overlycommercialized MFIs, Yunus' innovation--deploying social pressures to ensure
repayment in the absence of physical collateral--paved the way for further innovations
along these lines. These innovations ultimately resulted in an agencement that suffered
repeated crises due to its inability to manage the tension between "empowerment money"
158
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and the disciplinary power MFIs needed to use to create this kind of entrepreneurial
empowerment. After each crisis--and in particular after the Andhra Pradesh crisis--the
industry reframed its handling of this tension, and in particular claimed that these crises
resulted from too much commercialization and wholesale importation of "Wall Street
values." This narrative offers a plausible explanation for abusive lending practices; but
from a performative perspective, it also points to the way that the particular agencements
of microfinance, constituted in part by the language and technologies referred to as
"social capital," played out in ways that microfinance industry consultants, observers,
experts, and advocates could not have expected.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to bridge a gap in the critical literature between the
economic performativity theorists, who resist the reification of neoliberal power, while
also accounting for real power disparities and the alliance between the microfinance
industry and large IOs and IFOs. The picture of the industry that emerges involves
different camps deploying various skills, technologies, discourses, and networks with a
view towards constituting a "microfinance subject." Any serious analysis of the
microfinance industry must account for its relation to "institutional power,"161
considering the support emanating from the World Bank and United Nations, as well as
the unique role of institutions close to the industry such as CGAP.
Yet while this power may structure struggles between different camps within the
microfinance industry and between the industry and microfinance critics, it does not
determine them, as the resurgence of the "weaker" Bangladesh consensus after the
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Andhra Pradesh crisis shows. With this perspective in mind, I turn in the final chapter to
the implications of my analysis, before identifying alternatives to the dominant paradigms
in microfinance.
In this chapter, I have sketched a picture of some of the agencements
underpinning the microfinance industry. In offering a performative perspective on
microfinance practice, I have attempted to offer a picture of microfinance practice that
emphasizes the relations between clients, MFIs, the World Bank, CGAP, Grameen, and
so on. In the next chapter, then, I turn to a few kinds of institutions that are underpinned
by and in turn constitute agencements that potentially offer greater agency to clients and
pose less of a threat of exploitation than either Bangladesh or post-Washington consensus
MFIs, dependent as they are on turning social relations into a "riskscape."162
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Conclusion
Asked in an interview what she thought the results of the UN’s Year of
Microcredit were, Christina Barrineau, senior technical advisor to the Year of
Microcredit, said: "people stopped seeing microcredit only as a ten-dollar loan to
a woman buying a goat, and started seeing the poor as masterful business people,
tremendously entrepreneurial--people who have fundamental business skills and
really warrant access to financial services that will help them grow their
wealth."163
Barrineau's succinct articulation of the notion of the entrepreneurial poor underscores the
role the microfinance industry has played in producing and disseminating this discourse.
Much of the critical debate over microfinance has revolved around the productive effects
of this (mis)representation. In this paper, I have argued for a need to reframe the
discourse of the microfinance industry in terms of the social and material forces that
mediate the industry's attempts to produce this subject. In the first three chapters, I have
explored certain aspects of these agencements in order to argue that the microfinance
industry's self-presentation fails to capture the complexity of constituting "microfinance
subjects," and instead reframes new forms and distributions of risk in terms of
"empowerment," "human development," or "Progress out of Poverty."
Having examined some aspects of microfinance agencements, is worth briefly
revisiting the selective history of microfinance offered in Chapter 1. Although financial
services for the poor existed in many places in some form or another well before the
twentieth century, what is generally understood as contemporary "microfinance" began
with Muhammad Yunus' experiment with lending to the rural poor in Bangladesh. Yunus
realized that peer monitoring and enforcement could substitute for the physical collateral
that formal financial institutions generally required. Yunus' struggle to have microfinance
taken seriously as a development intervention occurred against a backdrop of changing
163
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development paradigms. As the end of the Cold War and resulting neoliberal shift
displaced the emphasis on human capital, microfinance offered development experts a
way to shift the burden of downsized civil servants from state to market. Unlike many
neoliberal development interventions, however, microfinance also suited the development
donor community's subsequent turn towards social issues and the Millennium
Development Goals. Because of the microfinance industry's ability to appeal to
competing development agendas, the industry assembled an unusually broad coalition of
actors.
Yet the diversity of actors supporting "microfinance" within the development
donor community belies the highly fractured nature of the microfinance industry. In order
to examine a key fracture within the industry, Chapter 2 analyzed two "monuments" of
microfinance discourse--Marguerite Robinson's The Microfinance Revolution and
Muhammad Yunus' Creating a World Without Poverty--that represent the divergence
between the post-Washington and Bangladesh camps on microfinance. Enthusiasm for
microfinance in the abstract generated heated debate within the industry about the risks of
commercial microfinance, and whether the rapid scaling of microfinance that
commercialization enabled justified these risks. The texts thus differ in how they frame
appropriate microfinance interventions, or indeed whether the other camp's interventions
can properly be considered microfinance.
In spite of these differences, both texts offer a fundamentally similar
understanding of poor people throughout the Global South as potential entrepreneurs
waiting only for access to capital in order to grow their assets--in other words, as
"microfinance subjects." In analyzing the microfinance industry in terms of the
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subjectivities it produces, I borrowed from David Williams' theorization of the "liberal
subject." Williams argues that NGOs and civil society in the Global South underpin
neoliberal development not by offering new forms of economic and social organization,
but by reconstituting subjects, or to borrow from Tom Young, "programming" them.
Williams' analysis points to the role NGOs and other development institutions play in this
process of constitution, and I have thus looked to the corollary role of microfinance
institutions in creating "microfinance subjects," whose subjectivity is influenced but not
determined by liberalism.
Williams' emphasis on the role of institutions, however, risks obscuring other
social and material forces at play in the constitution of liberal (or microfinance) subjects.
For this reason, I turned to the work of Michel Callon and economic performativity
theory to argue that microfinance subjectivity emerges out of competing agencements.
Understanding this subjectivity in terms of microfinance agencements points to the
diverse technologies, personnel, discourses, and arrangements of power underpinning the
constitution of microfinance subjects. In using this theoretical framework to understand
the microfinance industry, I drew on two recent studies of microfinance that have
deployed a similar method: Aitken's study of the microfinance industry's incorporation of
Anglo-American financial technique, and Henriksen's examination of the relation
between knowledge production and dissemination and the creation of a market for
microfinance. Both studies offer a new perspective on microfinance practice at the level
of markets and institutions. In my analysis, I have taken this framework to bear on a
different aspect of microfinance practice, namely the theorization and production of
microfinance subjects. This project, then, reframes previous work on the microfinance
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industry's relation to its clients and builds on the nascent literature examining
microfinance practice from a performative perspective.
The performative framework also offers a way of understanding new forms of
microfinance agencements. As both the history of microfinance outlined in Chapter 1 and
the analysis of microfinance agencements in Chapter 3 showed, the social and material
forces underpinning microfinance practice are not static. Changing technologies and the
importation of new financial technique into microfinance agencements have impacted not
only the scope of microfinance practice but also fundamentally altered the way the
industry relates to clients. These relations continue to change with the expansion of
websites such as kiva.org making microfinance accessible not only to financial actors in
the Global North but anyone with access to the Internet.164 Whether and how this model
might facilitate new microfinance agencements, or how it would change existing
agencements into which it is incorporated, merits further attention from a performative
perspective.
Recognizing that agencements are not static, further research might ask whether
varying microfinance agencements necessitate the production of a "microfinance
subject," or would at least mitigate the risks inherent to clients in the process of
constituting these subjects. While this project has not purported to offer policy solutions,
I believe contesting the notion of the "entrepreneurial poor" and identifying the risks
associated with producing microfinance subjects opens space for new microfinance
agencements to emerge that offer more meaningful forms of empowerment to clients.
While the agencements underpinning microfinance can have good or bad results, and
164
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often unexpectedly so, these agencements ultimately differ greatly in their ability to
empower clients and in the risks they hold for "microfinance subjects."
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